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.Preface
This dissertation consists of three self-contained essays on public finance,
that is, on the study of government revenue and expenditure. Taxation and
public spending reflect society’s values, priorities, as well as its political and
informational constraints. This makes them a fascinating subject for economic
research and a frequent topic of political debate.
Economists have recently studied the optimal design of tax policy using the
Mirrleesian mechanism design framework. At the core of this analysis lies a
trade-off between equity and efficiency: In order to maximize social welfare, a
utilitarian social planner wishes to redistribute consumption from individuals
who have high income-earning ability to those with less income-earning ability.
Because individual abilities are unobserved by the social planner, the optimal
tax system must be incentive compatible and involves distortions of labor efforts.
Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis contain analyses of this trade-off and the resulting
labor distortions. Researchers have also considered the effects of political com-
petition on income taxes and public good provision. This part of the literature
assumes that politicians design tax schedules in order to win elections instead
of maximizing social welfare. Chapters 1 and 3 concern the political economy of
taxation and public good provision. Methodologically, the analyses in all three
chapters utilize tools from microeconomic theory, in particular mechanism design
and game theory.
Chapter 1 jointly studies public good provision and nonlinear income taxa-
tion. It argues that public revenue and spending should be analyzed simultane-
ously, because the two are interdependent. Specifically, it assumes that individual
income earning ability is a function of innate talent and a public good. The pub-
lic good in turn is financed by distortionary taxes. The chapter then studies
how public good provision affects the efficiency of optimal income taxes and,
conversely, how taxation affects the efficiency of public good provision. It first
characterizes Pareto efficient allocations and an allocation that results from polit-
ical competition over both public good provision and nonlinear income taxation.
In the political equilibrium, the median voter’s favorite policy is the Condorcet
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winner in an election. Further, it shows that public good provision helps to mit-
igate the incentive problems of income taxation and that the efficiency of public
good provision is dependent on the position of the median voter in the income
distribution.
Chapter 2 studies optimal income taxation when individuals exhibit
intention-based preferences. The chapter is based on the conventional income
taxation model with individuals who differ in their skill type and a social plan-
ner who redistributes income subject to incentive compatibility and resource
constraints. However, it augments the standard taxation mechanism by offering
low-ability types the choice of exerting a higher labor effort, which results in
a higher utility for high-ability types. Under intention-based preferences, this
creates slack in the incentive constraint for high-ability types and allows us to
implement an allocation that is Pareto superior to the allocation that results
from the standard mechanism. The interpretation is that the rich do not mind
helping the poor if they "do their part" by working harder. Interestingly, with
intention-based preferences the optimal allocation lies outside the Pareto frontier
of the standard model and relies on individuals’ concern for procedural justice,
which cannot be characterized as the maximization of a social welfare function.
Chapter 3 characterizes demand for think tanks in the presence of academic
experts. It poses the question: how can demand for think tanks co-exist with
research that is made publicly available by academic researchers? To investigate
this question the chapter proposes a model in which voters differ in their pre-tax
incomes and exhibit uncertainty about the deadweight cost caused by taxation.
For example, they might be uncertain about the elasticity of taxable income or
the administrative cost of government. An academic expert observes the true
deadweight cost of the tax system and communicates this information to the
electorate via a cheap talk message. Additionally, voters can choose to pool their
resources to finance a partisan think tank that has access to the same information
as the academic expert. The chapter shows that individuals are willing to pay
for a think tank if and only if the academic expert is partisan with probability
greater than zero. That is, demand for think tanks exists if and only if academic
experts represent the interests of a certain part of the electorate, instead of
always providing truthful information.
.Chapter  
Voting over Public Good Provision and
Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules
 .  Introduction
In the public finance literature, theories of optimal income taxation and theories
of public good provision have mostly been treated separately. This is problem-
atic, because income taxation contributes to the financing of public goods which
implies clear interdependencies between the two. Further, public goods may im-
pact the incentive problems of income taxation and thus influence individual
preferences over taxes. Optimal policies of income taxation and public good pro-
vision are thus affected by their interdependency and should be analyzed jointly.
This becomes especially obvious when public goods affect individuals’ income
earning abilities.
This paper develops a model of nonlinear taxation in which taxes not only
serve to redistribute income but also to finance a public good. Individual in-
come earning ability is a function of the public good and innate ability, which
differs across individuals. The paper characterizes Pareto optimal public good
provision and income taxataion, subject to incentive compatibility and resource
constraints. It thereby addresses two main questions: How does public good
provision affect the incentive problems of income taxation? And how does this
retroact on Pareto efficient public good provision? After analyzing Pareto effi-
cient policies, the paper then considers the income tax schedule and public good
provision that arise out of political competition.
Related literature
The workhorse model of nonlinear income taxation is Mirrlees (1971). I extend
the standard model in two ways. First, while the standard model assumes that
tax revenue is used only for redistribution, this paper allows for investments
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of tax revenue into a public good that increases the income earning abilities of
individuals. Second, in addition to analyzing Pareto optimal taxation, this paper
characterizes tax schedules that arise out of political competition.
Political competition over linear tax schedules has been studied by Roberts
(1977) and Meltzer and Richard (1981). Recently, nonlinear income taxation has
been connected with political economy by Bierbrauer and Boyer (2013) and Bier-
brauer and Boyer (2015), who study Downsian competition over nonlinear tax
schedules. This paper is most closely related to Brett and Weymark (2017) and
Roell (2012), who analyze nonlinear taxation in a citizen-candidate framework
of political competition. I adopt their characterization of political competition
over tax schedules, but expand the policy space by allowing investments of tax
revenue into public good provision.
The preference model of individual income earning ability as a function of
innate talent and public goods is adopted from Weinzierl (2014), who character-
izes optimal benefit-based taxation when individuals’ benefits from public goods
are given by their income earning abilities. Matsumoto (2001) also considers
productivity enhancing public goods and analyzes their effect on the incentive
problems of taxation. Conversely, Atkinson and Stern (1974) and Boadway and
Keen (1993) have studied the optimal provision of public goods that are financed
with distortionary taxes.
 .  The model
There is an economy with n citizens who differ in their innate ability types
a1, ..., an, with aj > ak , j > k. Utility for a citizen of type ai is given by
ui(ci, yi, G) = ci   v
✓
yi
f(ai, G)
◆
(1.1)
where yi and ci denote his pre- and after tax income, respectively. There is a
disutility of labor v(·) with v0(·) > 0 and v00(·) > 0. As in Weinzierl (2014), citizen
i’s productivity is given by a function f(ai, G) which depends on his innate ability
ai and the provided level of a public good G. Individual productivity increases
in both ai and G, but at a diminishing rate, that is fG > 0 , fa > 0 , fG,G <
0 , and fa,a < 0, which is an intuitive assumption for a production function.
In this model, individuals derive no direct utility from the public good. In-
stead, public good provision increases the income earning abilities of individuals.
Possible examples of such goods could be public transportation, or investments
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in communication infrastructure such as broadband internet. These goods do
not bring direct pleasure to the people who use them, but increase their welfare
by enabling them to work more efficiently.
Note that the specifications of f(ai, G) imply that the Spence-Mirrlees single-
crossing property holds, independent of public good provision, since
@
@ai
v0
⇣
yi
f(ai,G)
⌘
f(ai, G)
=   fa(ai, G)
f(ai, G)
0@v00
⇣
yi
f(ai,G)
⌘
f(ai, G)
yi + v0
✓
yi
f(ai, G)
◆1A < 0 (1.2)
Hence, in an incentive compatible tax schedule, individuals of a higher ability
type will always be "richer" than individuals of a lower ability type in the sense
of pre- and after-tax income. As in Weinzierl (2014), I make use of the following
definitions and additional assumption on the shape of f(ai, G):
Assumption 1: The production function is multiplicative, that is f(ai, G) =
h(ai)g(G) for two differentiable functions h(ai) and g(G), both R+ ! R+.
Note that the commonly used Cobb-Douglas production function is a special
case of this multiplicative functional form.
Definition 1: The elasticity of individual productivity with respect to public
good provision, "G(G), is defined as:
"G(G) =
fG(ai, G)
f(ai, G)
G =
g0(G)
g(G)
G (1.3)
"G(G) denotes the percentage increase of f(ai, G), if G increases by one per-
cent. Assumption 1 is in fact equivalent to this elasticity being constant across all
individuals. The standard model can be seen as a special case of this assumption,
namely where "G(G) = 0.
 . .  Individually optimal policies
A policy consists of a tax system and a level of public good provision. The public
good is financed with tax revenue and has unit cost p. Admissible policies have
to be incentive compatible and budget balanced. By the taxation principle, a full
description of a tax system will be given by a list of pre- and after tax incomes
for all types. Hence, a policy {(cj, yj)nj=1, G} consists of a list of pre-tax and
after-tax incomes for all types and a level of public good provision.
As a first step, let me describe the first-best policy that maximizes Utilitarian
social welfare under full information over individuals’ types.
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Lemma 1: A first-best policy {(cFBj , yFBj )nj=1, GFB} is characterized by the
following three first-order conditions:
v0
 
yFBj
f(aj, GFB)
!
1
f(aj, GFB)
= 1 8j = 1, ..., n (1.4)
"G(GFB)
nX
j=1
yFBj = pGFB (1.5)
nX
j=1
 
yFBj   cFBj
    pGFB = 0 (1.6)
First-best policies are characterized by three equations. First, labor efforts
yj are elicited efficiently if the marginal cost of labor equals the marginal ben-
efit of consumption. Second, efficient public good provision is described by the
Samuelson rule, namely that the sum of citizens’ marginal benefits of public
good provision should equal the marginal cost of the public good. Third, the
public budget should be balanced.
Next, let me characterize Pareto optimal policies in second-best, that is,
when ability types are private information. Specifically, as the extreme cases of
Pareto efficient allocations, I characterize individually optimal policies. A policy
is individually optimal if it maximizes the utility of one citizen i, subject to
incentive compatibility and budget constraints. For the remainder of this section,
let i 2 {1, ..., n} denote the citizen for whom the second-best policy is individually
optimal. Formally, the policy solves the following maximization problem:
max
(c1,...,cn,y1,...,yn,G)
ui(ci, yi, G) (1.7)
subject to
uj(cj, yj, G)   uj(cj+1, yj+1, G) 8j = 1, ..., n   1 (1.8)
uj(cj, yj, G)   uj(cj 1, yj 1, G) 8j = 2, ..., n (1.9)
nX
j=1
(yj   cj)   pG   0 (1.10)
Note that single-crossing implies that incentive compatibility constraints are
redundant for non-adjacent types (Roell, 2012). The following two lemmas about
the individually optimal tax schedule of citizen i are adopted from Roell (2012).
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Lemma 2: At the optimum, the budget constraint is always binding:
nX
j=1
(yj   cj)   pG = 0 (1.11)
To see this, note that if the budget constraint was slack by some " > 0, then
there exists a policy {(cj + "n , yj)
n
j=1, G} that is incentive compatible, satisfies
the budget constraint, and gives citizen i higher utility. Hence the original tax
schedule could not have been individually optimal for i.
Lemma 3: For all j < i, the bundles (cj, yj) and (cj+1, yj+1) are connected
by citizen j’s upward incentive constraint. For all j > i, the bundles (cj, yj) and
(cj 1, yj 1) are connected by citizen j’s downward incentive constraint. That is:
uj(cj, yj, G) = uj(cj+1, yj+1, G) 8j < i (1.12)
uj(cj, yj, G) = uj(cj 1, yj 1, G) 8j > i (1.13)
Making use of these lemmas and maximizing (1.7) subject to (1.11), (1.12),
(1.13), the following are the first-order conditions with respect to (y1, ..., yn):
First-order condition with respect to yj, j < i:
 Mj := 1   v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
(1.14)
+ (j   1)

v0
✓
yj
f(aj 1, G)
◆
1
f(aj 1, G)
  v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
 
= 0
First-order condition with respect to yj, j > i:
 Rj := 1   v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
(1.15)
+ (n   j)

v0
✓
yj
f(aj+1, G)
◆
1
f(aj+1, G)
  v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
 
= 0
  |   Voting over Public Good Provision and Nonlinear Income Tax Schedules
First-order condition with respect to yi:
 i := 1   v0
✓
yi
f(ai, G)
◆
1
f(ai, G)
(1.16)
+ (i   1)

v0
✓
yi
f(ai 1, G)
◆
1
f(ai 1, G)
  v0
✓
yi
f(ai, G)
◆
1
f(ai, G)
 
+ (n   i)

v0
✓
yi
f(ai+1, G)
◆
1
f(ai+1, G)
  v0
✓
yi
f(ai, G)
◆
1
f(ai, G)
 
= 0
Brett and Weymark (2017) call  Mj and  Rj maxi-max and Rawlsian tax
schedules, respectively. The reason for this choice of names is that in order to
maximize citizen i’s utility, resources are diverted upwards from types below
her (as in a "maxi-max" tax schedule that maximizes the utility of the highest
type) and downwards from types above her (as in a Rawlsian tax schedule that
maximizes the utility of the lowest type).
To interpret the shape of the tax schedules, let us first consider  Mj and
recall that for all j < i, consumption-labor bundles are connected by the upward
incentive constraints.  Mj describes the marginal benefit for citizen i when the
labor effort of some citizen j is increased by one unit while maintaining incentive
compatibility and budget constraints. Increasing citizen j’s labor effort creates
one unit of consumption that can be diverted to citizen i. By compensating j
with v0
⇣
yj
f(aj,G)
⌘
1
f(aj,G) units of consumption, he stays on his initial indifference
curve and has no incentive to mimick the type above him. This move of j up his
indifference curve also leaves the incentive constraints of types above j untouched.
However, the (upward) incentive constraint of citizen j  1 is now slack. Hence
i can extract from all types below j the amount of consumption that will make
citizen j  1 indifferent between his old bundle and j’s new bundle. The sum of
these three effects makes up  Mj . (Brett and Weymark, 2017).
Similarly,  Rj describes the marginal benefit for citizen i of increasing the
labor effort of some citizen j > i. The difference to  Mj is that for types above i it
is downwards incentive constraints that bind. Moving a citizen j > i up his indif-
ference curve as described above violates the (downward) incentive constraints
for citizen j+ 1. Hence, all n  j types above j need to be compensated in terms
of consumption in order to restore incentive compatibility.
There is an important difference between these tax schedules and the ones
characterized in Brett and Weymark (2017). In their model,  Mj and  Mj are
independent of the type of citizen i, that is, the same amount of labor is elicited
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from citizen j, no matter if the policy is individually optimal for citizen i or
for another citizen k (with i, k 6= j). Here, on the other hand,  Mj and  Rj are
technically functions of G. Thus, the amount of labor that is elicited from citizen
j depends on the type of citizen i, if different types prefer different levels of public
good provision.
Given the amount of the public good provided, effort of types below i will be
distorted upward, whereas effort is distorted downward for types above i. Only
types 1’s and n’s effort levels are undistorted. The implicit marginal tax rate
facing citizen j, defined as
⌧j := 1   v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
(1.17)
is such that 8>><>>:
⌧j = 0 , if j 2 {1, n}
⌧j < 0 , if 1 < j < i
0 < ⌧j < 1 , if i < j < n
(1.18)
Proposition 1: Public good provision reduces the labor distortions for every
citizen. That is, as G increases, ⌧j gets closer to zero for all j = 2, . . . , n  1.
The public good helps to mitigate the incentive problems in the tax schedule
and reduces labor distortions. Labor distortions arise because of incentive com-
patibility constraints. Increasing the amount of public good provision reduces
the extent to which additional labor effort creates slack in the upward incentive
constraint. Since labor efforts for types below i are distorted upwards, the public
good reduces the distortion by making it less attractive for i to elicit additional
labor effort from types below him. Similarly, the public good reduces the ex-
tent to which additional labor effort violates the downward binding incentive
constraints. Types above i, who’s labor efforts are distorted downwards, thus
require less compensation for incentive compatibility to be restored. The public
good thus allows i to elicit a higher labor effort from higher types and reduces
their labor distortions as well.
The first-order condition of citizen i’s maximization problem with respect to
G is given by:
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p =
nX
j=1
v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
fG(aj, G)
f(aj, G)2
yj (1.19)
+
iX
j=1
(j   1)

v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
fG(aj, G)
f(aj, G)2
yj   v0
✓
yj
f(aj 1, G)
◆
fG(aj 1, G)
f(aj 1, G)2
yj
 
+
nX
j=i
(n   j)

v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
fG(aj, G)
f(aj, G)2
yj   v0
✓
yj
f(aj+1, G)
◆
fG(aj+1, G)
f(aj+1, G)2
yj
 
, pG = "G(G)
nX
j=1
yj (1.20)
Equation (1.19) depicts the first-order condition in a way similar to the
characterization by Boadway and Keen (1993). On the left hand side there is
the marginal cost of public good provision p. The first term on the right hand
side equals the sum of individuals’ marginal utilities of public good provision.
The Samuelson rule would end here. The additional two terms capture the effect
that the public good has on the incentive constraints of the tax schedule. The
first term concerns the upwards binding constraints for all types below i’s, and
the second term the downwards binding constraints for all types above i’s. Note
that these two terms are not zero, as the weak separability condition of Boadway
and Keen (1993) is not given here, and thus the first-order condition does not
equal the Samuelson rule. That is, citizen i’s individually optimal policy may
include a level of public good provision that is inefficient given the amount of
labor elicited.
There are two effects at work here that influence citizen i’s optimal level of
G. The first effect is that the public good increases i’s productivity and hence
her utility. It also increases everybody else’s utility and thus creates additional
room to divert resources away from all other citizens. This direct effect thus
unambiguously increases the citizen i’s optimal level of G. Note that the utility
gain is increasing in the type of citizen i. Financing the increase in G requires
eliciting higher amounts of labor from everyone. The higher the type of citizen i,
the lower her disutility from labor and thus the perceived cost of an extra unit
of G. Further, "G(G) being constant across types implies that the public good
gives higher types a greater marginal increase in income earning ability than
lower types.
The second effect at work here is the indirect effect that G has on the in-
centive constraints. For all citizens above i, that is on the downwards-binding
part of the tax schedule, any increase in G relaxes the incentive constraints and
gives room to divert resources away from them towards i. For all citizens below
i, however, incentive constraints are upwards-binding and hence tightened by
increases in G. Any extra unit of G that is provided thus requires compensating
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all citizens below i in order to restore incentive compatibility. This second effect
hence increases the optimal level of G if citizen i is of a relatively low type, but
decreases the optimal level of G if i of a relatively high type.
Substituting in equations (1.14), (1.15), and (1.16), the optimality condition
simplifies to (1.20). Equation (1.20) has a very clear interpretation: no matter
for which type a policy is individually optimal, it is always best to invest a
share "G(G) of the total output produced into public good provision. Hence a
fraction
 
1  "G(G)  of total output is then used for redistribution in the form
of consumption, as can easily be seen when combining equation (1.20) with the
public budget constraint:
nX
j=1
cj =
 
1   "G(G)  nX
j=1
yj (1.21)
Even though equation (1.20) does not lead to first-best efficient provision
of the public good, as explained above, it has in fact the same mathematical
structure as the first-best Samuelson rule (1.5). It turns out that when the public
good is financed by labor incomes that are distorted through a nonlinear income
schedule, the distortions of labor efforts cancel out some of the distortions of
public good provision. This is because public good provision and taxation have
opposite effects on the incentive constraints. An increase in G relaxes downwards-
binding incentive constraints and tightens upwards-binding constraints, while the
reverse is true for eliciting additional labor efforts.
 . .  Political equilibrium
I can now proceed to characterize the political equilibrium. In the following
subsection, I use superscripts to denote the identity of the individual for whom a
policy is individually optimal. That is, let {(cij, yij)nj=1, Gi} denote the individually
optimal policy for citizen i.
As in Brett and Weymark (2017), every citizen proposes their individually
optimal policy and all citizens engage in pairwise majority voting over the pro-
posed policies. Thus, if a Condorcet winner exists she is elected as policy maker
and implements her individually optimal policy. The timing works as follows:
First, citizens propose their favorite policies and the Condorcet winner is elected
as policy maker. Second, each citizen chooses his pre- and after tax income from
the policy maker’s proposed schedule, and the policy maker invests the proposed
amount of tax revenue into the public good. Third, utilities are realized.
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Proposition 2: Citizens of a higher ability type propose greater investments
into the public good:
Gi < Gi+1 8i = 1, ..., n   1 (1.22)
Recall the two effects that are at work here. Increasing G increases everyone’s
income earning ability and hence creates more resources that can be diverted
towards the policy maker. Citizens of higher types do not mind so much the extra
labor effort it takes to finance the public good. Further, because of the positive
complementartiy of public goods and innate talents, higher types derive higher
marginal utility from an extra unit of G. However, increasing G also means
having to compensate lower types with more consumption, because public good
provision tightens the upwards incentive constraints. Overall, the first, direct,
effect outweighs the cost of restoring incentive compatibility, and hence citizens
of higher types propose greater investments into public good provision.
Since we know that v0
⇣
yj
f(aj,G)
⌘
1
f(aj,G) > 1 on the maxi-max tax-schedule, it
becomes clear that citizens of high types, who’s individually optimal tax sched-
ules are mostly maxi-max, propose a higher level of G than the first-best Samuel-
son rule suggests. Citizens of low types, on the other hand, propose lower levels
of G than the first-best Samuelson rule suggests.
Corollary 1: Citizens of a low type propose levels of public good provision
that are lower than the first-best level, whereas citizens of a high type propose
levels that are higher than the first-best level:
G1 < GFB < Gn (1.23)
We know that for the lowest type it holds that
Pn
j=1 y1j <
Pn
j=1 yFBj . It then
follows from (1.5) and (1.20) that G1 < GFB. The reverse is true for the highest
type. Based on this corollary I conjecture that, if the type space is not too coarse,
there exists a citizen who proposes the first-best level of public good provision.
Lemma 4: Citizens of a higher ability type propose to elicit a higher effort
from all citizens:
yij < y
i+1
j 8j = 1, ..., n   1 (1.24)
This observation is intuitive, since higher types are more productive and
thus more willing to exert a higher labor effort. Further, Proposition 2 states
that higher types propose higher levels of public good provision. Increasing the
provision of G while maintaining incentive compatibility further increases the
need for additional labor efforts by the citizens.
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Proposition 3: All citizens have single-peaked preferences over the individ-
ually optimal policies {(cij, yij)nj=1, Gi}ni=1, that is:
uj(cij, yij, Gi)  uj(ci+1j , yi+1j , Gi+1) 8j > i (1.25)
uj(cij, yij, Gi)   uj(ci+1j , yi+1j , Gi+1) 8j < i (1.26)
Thus, there exists a Condorcet winner, namely the citizen of type aM, where aM
is the median of {a1, ..., an}.
This result shows that citizens have single-peaked preferences over individu-
ally optimal tax schedules even when tax revenue is used to finance a public good.
It implies that in the voting process described above, a Condorcet winner always
exists and that she is the citizen of the median type. The fact that the policy
that arises in political equilibrium is individually optimal for the median type
provides support for Director’s Law, as it can be interpreted as redistribution
towards the middle class (Brett and Weymark, 2017).
 .  Conclusion
The paper suggests that income taxation and public good provision ought to be
analyzed jointly, as they exhibit clear interdependencies when taxes do not only
serve to redistribute income, but also finance public spending. Modeling income
earning ability as a function of innate talent and public good provision makes
this evident.
I first characterized individually optimal policies as the extreme cases of
Pareto efficient allocations and showed that public good provision mitigates the
incentive problems of income taxation. Then I characterized the political equilib-
rium for this model by showing that individuals have single-peaked preferences
over individually optimal policies and thus the median voter’s favorite policy is
the Condorcet winner in election. We see that the level of public good provision
in political equilibrium is in fact increasing in the type of the median voter. That
is, the higher up the median voter stands in the income distribution, the more
public spending we should expect. We also see that public good provision is
inefficiently low (compared to the first-best level) if the median voter’s position
in the income distribution is relatively low. Conversely, public good provision is
inefficiently high if the median voter is high up in the income distribution. Thus,
efficiency of public spending depends on the skewdness of the income distribu-
tion.
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Appendix  .A
Proof of Lemma  :
Maximizing the utilitarian social welfare function
max
(c1,...,cn,y1,...,yn,G)
nX
j=1
✓
cj   v
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆◆
subject to the public budget constraint
nX
j=1
(yj   cj)   pG = 0
yields the first-order conditions as stated by Lemma 1.
Proofs of Lemma   and Lemma  :
see Roell (2012)
Proof of Proposition  :
Consider first the maxi-max tax schedule  Mj in equation (1.14). The distortion
of citizen j’s labor supply is given by the term
v0
✓
yj
f(aj 1, G)
◆
1
f(aj 1, G)
  v0
✓
yj
f(aj, G)
◆
1
f(aj, G)
> 0 (1.27)
If we increase G, this distortionary term becomes smaller since
@
@G
h
v0
⇣
yj
f(aj 1,G)
⌘
1
f(aj 1,G)   v0
⇣
yj
f(aj,G)
⌘
1
f(aj,G)
i
(1.28)
= "G(G)
h
v00
⇣
yj
f(aj,G)
⌘
yj
f(aj,G)2
  v00
⇣
yj
f(aj 1,G)
⌘
yj
f(aj 1,G)2
+v0
⇣
yj
f(aj,G)
⌘
1
f(aj,G)   v0
⇣
yj
f(aj 1,G)
⌘
1
f(aj 1,G)
i
< 0 (1.29)
Conversely, the distortionary term in the Rawlsian tax schedule  Rj , which
is negative, is increasing in G.
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Proof of Proposition  :
Making use of Assumption 1, the FOC with respect to public good provision
(1.19) is given by:
"G(Gi)
Gi
nX
j=1
yij   p = 0 (1.30)
Using (1.14), (1.15), and (1.16) we get that
@
@ai
24"G(Gi)
Gi
nX
j=1
yij   p
35 = "G(Gi)
Gi
@yi
@ai
> 0 (1.31)
Further, by optimality of {(cij, yij)nj=1, Gi} it needs to hold that
@
@G
24"G(Gi)
Gi
nX
j=1
yij   p
35 < 0 (1.32)
so that the implicit function theorem implies that
@Gi
@ai
=  
@
@ai
h
"G(Gi)
Gi
Pn
j=1 yij   p
i
@
@G
h
"G(Gi)
Gi
Pn
j=1 yij   p
i > 0 (1.33)
Proof of Lemma  :
Consider the case j < i. By optimality of {(cij, yij)nj=1, Gi} it needs to hold that
@ Mj
@yij
< 0 (1.34)
Making use of Assumption 1 and simplifying, we get that
@ Mj
@G
=  "
G(Gi)
Gi
 
yij
@ Mj
@yij
  1
!
> 0 (1.35)
so that applying the implicit function theorem and simplifying yields
@yij
@G
=  
@ Mj
@G
@ Mj
@yij
=
"G(Gi)
Gi
0B@yij   1@ Mj
@yij
1CA > 0 (1.36)
By the same logic this can be shown for j   i. The result then follows, since
@yij
@ai =
@yij
@Gi
@Gi
@ai > 0.
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Proof of Proposition  :
Before beginning the main proof I first show that for all j < i it holds that
@
@ai
 
yij
g(Gi)
!
> 0 (1.37)
,
@yij
@ai
g(Gi) g0(Gi) @Gi@ai y
i
j
g(Gi)2 > 0 (1.38)
, @y
i
j
@ai g(G
i)   g0(Gi)@Gi@ai yij > 0 (1.39)
, @y
i
j
@ai  
g0(Gi)
g(Gi)
@Gi
@ai y
i
j > 0 (1.40)
, @y
i
j
@Gi
@Gi
@ai  
g0(Gi)
g(Gi)
@Gi
@ai y
i
j > 0 (1.41)
, @y
i
j
@Gi   "
G(Gi)
Gi y
i
j > 0 (1.42)
, "G(Gi)Gi
0B@yij   1@ Mj
@yij
1CA   "G(Gi)Gi yij > 0 (1.43)
,   "G(Gi)Gi 1@ Mj
@yij
> 0 (1.44)
(1.45)
The last statement is clearly true since
@ Mj
@yij
< 0. It then follows that
) y
i 1
j
f(aj,Gi 1)
 y
i
j
f(aj, Gi)
(1.46)
, y
i 1
j
f(aj,Gi 1)
f(aj 1,Gi 1) f(aj,Gi 1)
f(aj 1,Gi 1)
 y
i
j
f(aj, Gi)
f(aj 1, Gi 1)   f(aj, Gi 1)
f(aj 1, Gi 1)
(1.47)
, y
i 1
j
f(aj,Gi 1)
  y
i 1
j
f(aj 1,Gi 1)
 y
i
j
f(aj, Gi)
  y
i
j f(aj, Gi 1)
f(aj, Gi)f(aj 1, Gi 1)
(1.48)
, y
i 1
j
f(aj,Gi 1)
  y
i 1
j
f(aj 1,Gi 1)
 y
i
j
f(aj, Gi)
  y
i
j
f(aj 1, Gi)
(1.49)
Where the last step follows because Assumption 1 implies that
f(aj, Gi 1)
f(aj, Gi)
=
f(aj 1, Gi 1)
f(aj 1, Gi)
(1.50)
Finally, by convexity of v(·) and Lemma 4 it follows that
v
 
yi 1j
f(aj, Gi 1)
!
  v
 
yi 1j
f(aj 1, Gi 1)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj, Gi)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj 1, Gi)
!
8j < i
(1.51)
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Similarly, for all j > i it holds that
v
 
yi+1j
f(aj, Gi+1)
!
  v
 
yi+1j
f(aj+1, Gi+1)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj, Gi)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj+1, Gi)
!
8j > i
(1.52)
The proof is then by induction. Consider first the case j > i.
Base case (holds by optimality of {(ci+1j , y
i+1
j )
n
j=1, Gi+1}):
ui+1(cii+1, yii+1, Gi)  ui+1(ci+1i+1, yi+1i+1, Gi+1) (1.53)
Inductive step:
uj(cij, yij, Gi)  uj(ci+1j , yi+1j , Gi+1) (1.54)
together with Lemma 4 and
v
 
yi+1j
f(aj, Gi+1)
!
  v
 
yi+1j
f(aj+1, Gi+1)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj, Gi)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj+1, Gi)
!
(1.55)
implies that
uj+1(cij, yij, Gi)  uj+1(ci+1j , yi+1j , Gi+1) (1.56)
so that by Lemma 3 it follows that:
uj+1(cij+1, yij+1, Gi) = uj+1(cij, yij, Gi) (1.57)
 uj+1(ci+1j , yi+1j , Gi+1) (1.58)
= uj+1(ci+1j+1, y
i+1
j+1, G
i+1) (1.59)
Conversely, for the case j < i:
Base case (holds by optimality of {(ci 1j , y
i 1
j )
n
j=1, Gi 1}):
ui 1(cii 1, yii 1, Gi)  ui 1(ci 1i 1, yi 1i 1, Gi 1) (1.60)
Inductive step:
uj(cij, yij, Gi)  uj(ci 1j , yi 1j , Gi 1) (1.61)
together with Lemma 4 and
v
 
yi 1j
f(aj, Gi 1)
!
  v
 
yi 1j
f(aj 1, Gi 1)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj, Gi)
!
  v
 
yij
f(aj 1, Gi)
!
(1.62)
implies that
uj 1(cij, yij, Gi)  uj 1(ci 1j , yi 1j , Gi 1) (1.63)
so that by Lemma 3 it follows that:
uj 1(cij 1, yij 1, Gi) = uj 1(cij, yij, Gi) (1.64)
 uj 1(ci 1j , yi 1j , Gi 1) (1.65)
= uj 1(ci 1j 1, y
i 1
i 1, G
i 1) (1.66)
which concludes the proof.
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.Chapter  
Optimal Income Taxation with
Intention-Based Preferences: an
Exploration
 .  Introduction
The human tendency to develop emotional responses to taxation and redistribu-
tion is well-documented in the literature on public finance. For example, Bassetto
and Phelan (2008) describe "riots" against income taxes and Slemrod (2000) an-
alyzes – in an analogy to Ayn Rand’s dystopic novel "Atlas shrugs" – whether
high-income earners reduce their labor efforts to protest against taxes that de-
preciate their contribution to society. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) suggest that
so-called "free-loaders" – meaning individuals who choose not to work under an
existing transfer system but would choose to work in its absence – are perceived
as taking advantage of society. As a consequence, the authors venture, society
may wish to disregard the wellbeing of free-loaders in its social welfare objective.
Empirical support for this argument can be found in the political success of the
earned income tax credit (EITC) in the United States. Arguably, EITC’s success
stems from its strong work requirement while other programs with weaker work
requirements have proven to be politically unpopular. This suggests that people
do not mind helping the poor if they work, but the rich may oppose taxes if
others do not "do their part."
Although the papers cited above use language that is suggestive of emotional
reactions to taxes and redistribution, no work has been done to model such
emotions explicitly and to study their effect on optimal tax schedules.
A particularly interesting model to describe such emotions over taxes, in
which people wish to reward the poor who work hard and to punish those who
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"free-load," is given by the intention-based preference model of Rabin (1993).
In this model, individuals wish to reciprocate "kindness" of others. That is,
individuals like to "help those who are helping them" and "hurt those who are
hurting them." (Rabin, 1993)
This paper studies optimal taxation when individuals exhibit intention-based
preferences. It utilizes the income tax environment of Stiglitz (1982) where in-
dividuals have private information over their skill type and a social planner
redistributes income under incentive compatibility and resource constraints. In
the welfare maximizing allocation, the incentive constraint for the "high" type
is binding and labor effort for the "low" type is distorted downwards. I aug-
ment the Stiglitz (1982) mechanism by giving low types the option of exerting a
higher labor effort which will increase utility for high types. If individuals exhibit
intention-based preferences, high types interpret this additional labor effort as
kindness which they wish to reciprocate. This way, intention-based preferences
relax the incentive constraint of high types, which allows the social planner to
implement an allocation that is Pareto superior to the Stiglitz (1982) allocation.
If individuals do not exhibit intention-based preferences, then this mechanism
implements the same allocation as Stiglitz (1982).
This result has an important implication for recent attempts to incorporate
nonwelfarist objectives into optimal tax theory. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) pro-
pose that "generalized social marginal welfare weights" can characterize Pareto
optimal tax schedules that take into account nonwelfarist fairness concerns. This
paper provides an example of individual fairness concerns, namely intention-
based preferences, that make it impossible to characterize Pareto optimal allo-
cations through generalized social welfare weights. Indeed, if individuals exhibit
intention-based preferences we can implement allocations that lie outside the
Pareto frontier of the standard Stiglitz (1982) model. Further, because these
preferences capture a notion of procedural rather than outcome-based justice,
we must alter individuals’ choice sets in order to implement the optimal alloca-
tion.
 . .  Related literature
The model draws from the income tax environment of Stiglitz (1982). For a pref-
erence model to describe emotions over taxes, I refer to Rabin (1993), which
was introduced into the mechanism design framework by Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2016). Rabin’s model considers individuals who are willing to sacrifice parts of
their own payoff in order to reward others who have kind intentions towards
them (or to punish those who do not). I augment the Stiglitz (1982) mechanism
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by allowing less productive individuals to exert a higher labor effort, so that
their additional output can be used to increase the consumption of more pro-
ductive individuals. Highly productive individuals will perceive this additional
labor effort as kind and will be willing to support allocations that would vio-
late incentive compatibility in the standard model of Stiglitz (1982). In other
words, intention-based preferences create slack in the incentive constraint of
"high types." This makes Rabin’s model particularly interesting to study the
above-mentioned aversion against "free loaders" that was suggested by Saez and
Stantcheva (2016).
This paper adapts Rabin’s model as a group rule. The literature on group
rules, in particular rule utilitarianism, goes back to Harsanyi (1977). It observes
that individual behavior often has a negligible effect on overall welfare, thus
making it difficult to evaluate individual choices by a Utilitarian metric. Instead,
Harsanyi suggests to consider the effect on social welfare that an individual’s
behavior would have if it became a general rule that was followed by everyone
else as well. Harsanyi (1980), Coate and Conlin (2004), and Feddersen and San-
droni (2006) apply this concept to voting behavior, where individuals want to
"do their part" in society by following a rule that, if followed by everyone else,
would maximize the group’s aggregate utility. I use the same logic to formulate
intention-based preferences as a group rule. However, instead of being rule Utili-
tarianists individuals act according to Rabin’s model. That is, they evaluate the
kindness of an action by considering the consequences that this action would
have if it was followed by everybody else.
This paper is related to work on normative diversity and the use of nonwel-
farist principles. This literature proposes welfare objectives that are not purely
Utilitarian but instead weigh the Utilitarian norm with nonwelfarist objectives.
Weinzierl (2014) provides evidence for the prevalence of such normative diver-
sity and its explanatory power for the deviation of existing tax policies from the
recommendations of the standard model. Saez and Stantcheva (2016) character-
ize Pareto efficient allocations by using generalized social welfare weights, which
also allow for welfare criteria other than Utilitarianism. Weinzierl (2017) further
uses the example of envy to show that rule Utilitarianism can guide public policy
when nonwelfarist rules contain relevant information for a welfarist planner with
limited information. The current paper differs from this literature by maintain-
ing the Utilitarian criterion to evaluate allocations, but introducing a preference
model that captures a procedural (rather than consequentialist) justice concern.
This leads to equilibrium allocations that cannot be characterized by a social
welfare function or other outcome-based measures such as generalized marginal
social welfare weights.
   |   Optimal Income Taxation with Intention-Based Preferences: an Exploration
Table  . . Prisoners’ dilemma
Player 2
C D
Player 1
C 23 ,
2
3 0, 1
D 1, 0 13 ,
1
3
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. I first introduce Ra-
bin’s model of intention-based preferences by considering a simple example of a
prisoners’ dilemma. Second, I outline the income taxation mechanism of Stiglitz
(1982). Third, I formulate Rabin (1993) as a group rule and provide a model
of intention-based preferences in a large economy, where individual actions have
a negligible effect on social welfare. Lastly, I show that with such preferences
there exists an allocation that is Pareto superior to the constrained optimum in
Stiglitz (1982) and propose a mechanism that implements this allocation as the
unique equilibrium.
 . .  A simple example of intention-based preferences
This subsection provides a simple example of a prisoners’ dilemma to show that
under intention-based preferences we can sustain cooperative behavior. This
should serve as an explanation of the nature of intention-based preferences, and
also give the reader an early illustration of how such preferences can relax indi-
viduals’ incentive constraints in a model of income taxation.
Consider the following example of a prisoners’ dilemma from Rabin (1993).
Two players i = 1, 2 each choose an action ai 2 {C,D}: cooperate or defect. Let
⇡i(ai, aj) be the "material" payoff for player i if she plays action ai and her
opponent j plays action aj. Table 2.1 shows the well known matrix of material
payoffs for this game. If players only care about their material payoffs, then
famously there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which both players defect.
However, Rabin suggests that if individuals do not only care about material
payoffs but also about the "kindness" of each player, then there exists an alter-
native equilibrium in which both players cooperate. Here, "kindness" refers to a
player’s effort to increase her opponent’s material payoff, irrespective of whether
she hurts her own material payoff in the process.
 .  Introduction |   
To understand Rabin’s argument, suppose it is common knowledge that both
players cooperate. Then each player is aware that their opponent sacrifices ma-
terial payoff equal to 13 in order to help sustain the cooperative outcome. Rabin
argues that in choosing to cooperate while knowing that her opponent also coop-
erates, player i effectively chooses a payoff ⇡j(C,C) = 23 for her opponent, when
she could have also chosen to defect and leave her opponent with a lower ma-
terial payoff of ⇡j(C,D) = 0. For this reason, for player i to cooperate means to
act kindly towards her opponent. If individuals derive enough utility from recip-
rocating such kindness, then cooperation may indeed be a mutual best response
and (C, C) can be sustained in equilibrium.
To formalize this idea, Rabin proposes that player i’s kindness should be
measured by how well she leaves her opponent off relative to an "equitable"
payoff
⇡ej (abi ) =
1
2
 
⇡hj (abi ) + ⇡lj(abi )
 
(2.1)
Here, ⇡hj (abi ) denotes the highest material payoff that player j can achieve if he
plays some action abi . On the other hand, ⇡lj(abi ) denotes the lowest material
payoff that is possible for player j in any of the Pareto efficient outcomes that
he can achieve by playing abi . In the prisoners’ dilemma, if player j chooses to
cooperate, then ⇡hj (C) =
2
3 and ⇡
l
j(C) = 0. His "equitable" payoff is then given
by the average of the possible payoffs, namely ⇡ej (C) =
1
3 .
Rabin’s model suggests that player i is "kind" towards her opponent if she
leaves player j with a material payoff that is higher than her "equitable" payoff
⇡ej (abi ). Specifically, Rabin defines player i’s kindness towards player j as follows.
Definition 1: Player i’s kindness towards player j is given by:
i(ai, abj ) =
⇡j(ai, abi )   ⇡ej (abi )
⇡hj (abi )   ⇡minj (abi )
(2.2)
Here ⇡minj (abi ) denotes the worst material payoff that player j can achieve if he
plays action abj . It is clear that player i’s kindness i(ai, abj ) is positive (negative)
whenever her action leaves her opponent better (worse) off than the equitable
payoff ⇡ej (abi ).
In the prisoners’ dilemma example, suppose again player i knows that her
opponent will cooperate, that is, abi = C. Player j’s equitable payoff is then given
by ⇡ej (abi ) =
1
3 , the average of the two payoffs that are possible if he cooperates.
Thus, if player i chooses to cooperate as well and grant her opponent the higher
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of the two possible payoffs, then her action results in positive kindness
i(C,C) =
⇡j(C,C)   ⇡ej (C)
⇡hj (C)   ⇡minj (C)
(2.3)
=
2
3   13
2
3   0
(2.4)
=
1
2
(2.5)
Alternatively, if player i chooses to defect, her action results in negative kindness
i(D,C) =
⇡j(C,D)   ⇡ej (C)
⇡hj (C)   ⇡minj (C)
(2.6)
=
0   13
2
3   0
(2.7)
=  1
2
(2.8)
Note that because the kindness function is normalized, its value must lie in
the interval i(ai, abj ) 2 [ 1, 12 ].
Now consider the following utility function which captures "intention-based"
preferences.
ui(ai, abi ) = ⇡i(ai, abi ) +  
 
1 + i(ai, abi )
 
j(abi , ai) (2.9)
Each individuals derives utility from her material payoff and also from re-
ciprocating her opponent’s kindness. An exogenous weight   determines how
strongly individuals care about reciprocating kindness relative to their material
payoff. Note that if player i expects her opponent to exert negative kindness
towards her (that is, if j(abi , abbi ) < 0), then player i’s utility increases if she
exerts negative kindness herself. Conversely, if she expects her opponent to exert
positive kindness, then player i benefits from doing the same. Hence, individuals
with intention-based preferences have a taste for reciprocity: they wish to be
kind to those who are kind to them, and unkind to others.
This means that in our prisoners’ dilemma example, where player i expects
her opponent to cooperate and thus to exert positive kindness, intention-based
preferences create an incentive for her to reciprocate with positive kindness as
well. Both players expect each other to cooperate, that is, abi = abbi = C. Hence,
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player j’s expected kindness is given by j(C,C) = 12 . Player i’s utility from
cooperating or defecting is then given by:
ui(C,C, ) =
2
3
+  (1 +
1
2
)(
1
2
) (2.10)
ui(D,C) = 1 +  (1   12)(
1
2
) (2.11)
Player i will thus find it profitable to cooperate whenever     23 . In this case, if
individuals exhibit intention-based preferences we can sustain an equilibrium in
which both players cooperate, which Pareto dominates the Nash equilibrium in
which both players defect.
 . .  Income taxation in the Stiglitz (    ) mechanism
Just as intention-based preferences can reduce individuals’ incentives to "defect"
in a prisoners’ dilemma, as explained in the previous example, the remainder of
this paper will explore how they can relax incentive constraints in a model of
optimal taxation.
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals I of mass 1. An al-
location {(ck, yk)k2I} consists of a bundle of consumption c and output y for
every individual. Individuals differ in their productivity types wi 2 {wL.wH},
with wL < wH. Types are private information and the population share of each
type equals one half.
Along the lines of the Stiglitz (1982) model of income taxation, preferences
for individuals of some type wi are given by
⇡i = c   v
✓
y
wi
◆
(2.12)
I will refer to ⇡i as the individual’s "material payoff." Here, y and c denote indi-
vidual output and consumption. Material payoff is quasi-linear in consumption
and individuals incur a cost of labor v(·) with v0(·) > 0 and v00(·) > 0.
The social planner offers every individual a set of actions A = {aL, aH} and
specifies an allocation {(cL, yL), (cH, yH)} that maps each action into an individ-
ual consumption-output bundle. That is, individuals who choose action ai will
consume ci and produce yi.
The planner wishes to redistribute income from highly productive individuals
to less productive individuals, while maintaining incentive compatibility and
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resource constraints. Formally, the planner’s objective is
max ↵
⇣
c(aL)   v
⇣
y(aL)
wL
⌘⌘
+ (1   ↵)
⇣
c(aH)   v
⇣
y(aH)
wH
⌘⌘
(2.13)
subject to c(aL)   v
⇣
y(aL)
wL
⌘
  c(aH)   v
⇣
y(aH)
wL
⌘
(2.14)
c(aH)   v
⇣
y(aH)
wH
⌘
  c(aL)   v
⇣
y(aL)
wH
⌘
(2.15)
y(aL)   c(aL) + y(aH)   c(aH)   0 (2.16)
where ↵ > 0.5 is the planner’s welfare weight on the material payoff of low types,
so that the planner’s objective is to redistribute resources towards low types. The
two incentive constraints ensure that individuals self-select into the consumption-
output bundle that corresponds to their productivity type. Lastly, the resource
constraints ensures that total output equals total consumption. The allocation
that maximizes the planner’s objective subject to these constraints is shown by
Stiglitz (1982) and summarized in Definition 2.
Definition 2: The second-best allocation as shown by Stiglitz (1982) is
denoted (cSBL , y
SB
L , c
SB
H , y
SB
H ) and is characterized by the following four equations:
v0
✓
ySBH
wH
◆
1
wH
= 1 (2.17)
v0
✓
ySBL
wL
◆
1
wL
= 1  
✓
v0
✓
ySBL
wL
◆
1
wL
  v0
✓
ySBL
wH
◆
1
wH
◆
(2.18)
cSBH   v
✓
ySBH
wH
◆
= cSBL   v
✓
ySBL
wH
◆
(2.19)
cSBL + c
SB
H = y
SB
L + y
SB
H (2.20)
First, the second-best allocation leaves output for high types undistorted, so that
the marginal disutility of labor equals the marginal benefit of consumption. Sec-
ond, the incentive compatibility constraint of low types is binding. This implies
that, third, output for low types is distorted downwards. Fourth, the resource
constraint is binding.
 .  Income taxation and intention-based preferences
In this section I propose the optimal mechanism if individuals follow intention-
based preferences as a group rule. I augment the Stiglitz (1982) mechanism by
offering low type individuals the choice of exerting a higher labor effort. I then
construct the optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H) that can be implemented by the
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mechanism and show that it is Pareto superior to the Stiglitz (1982) second-best
allocation (cSBL , y
SB
L , c
SB
H , y
SB
H ).
 . .  Intention-based preferences in a large economy
To adopt Rabin’s two player-model in the context of a large economy, I will
define intention-based preferences as a group rule.
As explained in the previous section, Rabin’s model in its original form ap-
plies to a two-player environment like the prisoners’ dilemma, in which an action
taken by player i has a direct effect on the material payoff of player j. In a large
economy, the environment in which the Stiglitz (1982) income tax model is set,
individual actions have no impact on the wellbeing of others. Instead, a person
only determines her own material payoff by self-selecting into one of the two pos-
sible consumption-output bundles. The material payoff of others is unaffected
by this choice. Further, since each person has zero mass, individual actions also
have no effect on the public budget. This poses a problem when incorporating
Rabin’s model, which interprets "kindness" as an individual’s effort to increase
her opponent’s material payoff, into the context of income taxation.
As a solution, I adopt Rabin’s model as a so-called group rule, following
the work of Harsanyi (1977). Suppose an individual of type wi chooses some
action ai. In computing her own kindness, the individual does not only consider
the causal effect of her own action ai on the material payoffs of others. Instead,
she considers what the effect on the material payoffs of others would be if all
individuals of type wi were to choose action ai as well.
To formalize this idea, I first define the material payoffs that would arise if
all individuals of type wi were to behave just like individual i.
Definition 3: For individual i with type wi 2 {wL, wH}, let
⇡˜i(ai, abi ) (2.21)
denote i’s material payoff if all individuals of type wi choose action ai and all
individuals of type wj 6= wi choose action abi .
The kindness function is then adapted as follows:
˜i(ai, abi ) =
⇡˜j(abi , ai)   ⇡ej (abi )
⇡hj (abi )   ⇡minj (abi )
(2.22)
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where ⇡hj (abi ) and ⇡minj (abi ) are, respectively, the highest and lowest material
payoff that individuals of type wj could reach given that they chose action abi .
As explained in the previous section, ⇡ej (abi ) is called the equitable payoff, and
specified as
⇡ej (abi ) =
1
2
 
⇡hj (abi )   ⇡lj(abi )
 
(2.23)
where ⇡lj(abi ) is the lowest material payoff among all Pareto efficient outcomes
possible for individuals of type wj given that they chose action abi . Again, the
kindness function thus always lies within the interval [ 1, 12 ].
 . .  The optimal mechanism
The mechanism offers three actions A = {aH, aL, aL⇤} to each individual. As in
the Stiglitz (1982) mechanism, aH and aL will be interpreted as a message that
the individual has a high or low productivity type, respectively. Additionally,
aL⇤ will be interpreted as a message that the individual has a low productivity
type and wishes to exert a higher labor effort y⇤L > y
SB
L . The mechanism thus
augments the Stiglitz (1982) mechanism by offering low type individuals the
choice of exerting a higher labor effort.
The outcomes of this mechanism are as follows. Let (⇢L, ⇢L⇤ , ⇢H) denote
the proportion of individuals who play actions aL, aL⇤ , and aH respectively. If
⇢H   12 then everyone who played aH receives (y⇤H, c⇤H), everyone who played aL
⇤
receives (y⇤L, c
⇤
L), and everyone who played a
L receives (ySBL , c
SB
L ). In this case,
if high type individuals truthfully reveal their type, then low type individuals
may choose to exert a higher labor effort that results in additional consumption
(c⇤H > c
SB
H ) for high types. Otherwise, if ⇢
H < 12 , then everyone who played a
H
receives (ySBH , c
SB
H ), and everyone who played a
L⇤ or aL receives (0, 0).
Intuitively, the idea of this mechanism is to redistribute part of the additional
output – which is produced by those low type individuals who play action aL⇤
and produce y⇤L – towards high type individuals. This way, as will be explained
below, exerting a higher labor effort will generates positive kindness for low
types because it increases the material payoff for high types. High types can
reciprocate positive kindness simply by "revealing" their type, which prevents
those who played aL from receiving zero payoff.
Table 2.2 summarizes the allocations that result from this mechanism if all
individuals with the same type choose the same action. This means that Table 2.2
depicts exactly the allocations that individuals take into account for when they
follow intention-based preferences as a group rule, as described by Definition 3.
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Table  . . Allocations that arise if all individuals of the same type play the same action
High types’ action
aL aL⇤ aH
Low types’ action
aL (0, 0), (0, 0) (0, 0), (0, 0) (cSBL , y
SB
L ), (c
SB
H , y
SB
H )
aL⇤ (0, 0), (0, 0) (0, 0), (0, 0) (c⇤L, y
⇤
L), (c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H)
aH (cSBH , y
SB
H ), (c
SB
L , y
SB
L ) (c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H), (c
⇤
L, y
⇤
L) (c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H), (c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H)
For example, recall that ⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aH) and ⇡˜H(aH, aL
⇤) depict the material payoff
for low types and high types if all low types play aL⇤ and all high types play
aH. In this case, as summarized by Table 2.2, low types receive (c⇤L, y
⇤
L) and high
types receive (c⇤H, y
⇤
H).
 . .  Preferences and equilibrium
Let si 2 A denote the strategy of an individual of type wi. Each individual forms
first-order and second-order beliefs over the strategies of other players. Let sbi 2
A denote her first-order belief over the strategy played by individuals of type
wj 6= wi. Further, sbbi denotes this individual’s second-order belief over all other
players’ beliefs over her strategy.
Utility for an individual of type wi is given by
ui(si, sbi , sbbi ) = ⇡i(si, sbi ) +  
 
1 + ˜i(si, sbi )
 
˜j(sbi , sbbi ) (2.24)
The following equilibrium definition is adopted from Bierbrauer and Netzer
(2016).
Definition: A Bayes-Nash Fairness Equilibrium (BNFE) is a strategy
profile s⇤ such that 8i, j with j 6= i :
s⇤i 2 arg maxsi2A ui(si, s
b
i , sbbi ) (2.25)
sbi = s⇤j (2.26)
sbbi = s⇤i (2.27)
In BNFE, first- and second-order beliefs are required to be correct and every
individual maximizes their utility given beliefs.
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 . .  Constructing the optimal allocation
In the following I will construct the optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H) subject
to budget and incentive constraints that can be reached as a BNFE by the
mechanism described above.
Suppose there exists a BNFE in which all low types play s⇤L = a
L⇤ and all
high types play s⇤H = a
H. Then for high types the optimal consumption-output
bundle is given by
y⇤H = y
SB
H (2.28)
c⇤H = c
SB
H + " (2.29)
First, equation 2.28 states that the optimal labor effort for high types is undis-
torted. This follows the same logic as in Stiglitz (1982). Because intention-based
preferences do not affect individual’s marginal disutility of labor, it is still op-
timal to leave high types’ labor efforts at their efficient level y⇤H = y
SB
H . Second,
equation 2.29 states that some amount " of the additional output that is pro-
duced by low type individuals who choose aL⇤ should be redistributed towards
high types.
Intuitively, this ensures that high types receive a strictly higher material pay-
off whenever low types exert extra labor effort. Exerting a higher labor effort will
then generate positive kindness for low types, because it increases the material
payoff for high types. Clearly, (c⇤H, y
⇤
H) yields a strictly higher material payoff
than (cSBH , y
SB
H ), because it elicits the same amount of output but yields higher
consumption.
Next, let us specifically evaluate the kindness that a low type individual
generates by playing aL⇤ . If a low type chooses to play aL⇤ and believes that
high types play aH, then her kindness is given by:
˜L(aL
⇤
, aH) =
⇡˜H(aH, aL
⇤)   ⇡eH(aH
⇡hH(aH)   ⇡minH (aH)
(2.30)
=
⇡˜H(aH, aL
⇤)   12
 
⇡hH(a
H) + ⇡lH(a
H)
 
⇡hH(aH)   ⇡minH (aH)
(2.31)
=
⇡˜H(aH, aL
⇤)   12
 
⇡H(aH, aL
⇤) + ⇡H(aH, wL)
 
⇡H(aH, aL⇤)   ⇡H(aH, wL) (2.32)
=
1
2
(2.33)
Thus, exerting a higher labor effort indeed generates positive kindness for
low types. If low types play aL⇤ , high types will then wish to reciprocate by
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generating positive kindness as well. This creates leeway for the high type’s
incentive constraint. To see this, suppose high types play aH and believes that
low types will play aL⇤ . Then, the kindness of high types is given by:
˜H(aH, aL
⇤
) =
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aH)   ⇡eL(aL
⇤)
⇡hL(aL
⇤)   ⇡minL (aL⇤)
(2.34)
=
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aH)   12
 
⇡hL(a
L⇤) + ⇡lL(a
L⇤)
 
⇡hL(aL
⇤)   ⇡minL (aL⇤)
(2.35)
=
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aH)   12
 
⇡L(aL
⇤ , aH) + ⇡L(aL
⇤ , wL)
 
⇡H(aL⇤ , aH)   ⇡L(aL⇤ , wL) (2.36)
=
1
2
(2.37)
If instead high types were to play aL or aL⇤ , while believing that low types
play aL⇤ , then high types would generate negative kindness:
˜H(aL
⇤
, aL
⇤
) =
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aL⇤)   ⇡eL(aL
⇤)
⇡hL(aL
⇤)   ⇡minL (aL⇤)
(2.38)
=
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aL⇤)   12
 
⇡hL(a
L⇤) + ⇡lL(a
L⇤)
 
⇡hL(aL
⇤)   ⇡minL (aL⇤)
(2.39)
=
⇡˜L(aL
⇤ , aL⇤)   12
 
⇡L(aL
⇤ , wˆH) + ⇡L(aL
⇤ , aL⇤)
 
⇡H(aL⇤ , wˆH)   ⇡L(aL⇤ , aL⇤) (2.40)
=  1
2
(2.41)
Hence, for high types who believe that low types will play aL⇤ , "revealing"
their type (by playing aH) generates positive kindness, while "pretending" to
be a low type (by playing aL or aL⇤) generates negative kindness. In order to
reciprocate the low types’ positive kindness, high types will be willing to reveal
their type even if this results in a smaller material payoff. Specifically, pretending
to be a low type would result in a utility loss of
 (1 + ˜H(aH, aL
⇤
))˜L(aL
⇤
, aH)    (1 + ˜H(aL⇤ , aL⇤))˜L(aL⇤ , aH) (2.42)
which equals  2 .
We can then write a new incentive constraint for high types that includes
the utility derived from kindness and will be binding in the optimal allocation:
Lemma 1: In the optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H), the high type’s incen-
tive constraint is given by
c⇤H   v
✓
y⇤H
wH
◆
  c⇤L   v
✓
y⇤L
wH
◆
   
2
(2.43)
   |   Optimal Income Taxation with Intention-Based Preferences: an Exploration
Intention-based preferences thus create slack in the high type’s incentive
constraint. The new constraint allows the planner to allocate a higher material
payoff to low types (compared to the Stiglitz (1982) allocation) that would violate
incentive compatibility if individuals did not exhibit intention-based preferences.
This way, the planner can also allow smaller distortions of the low type’s labor
supply.
Equation 2.43 implicitly characterizes the optimal labor supply y⇤L for low
types. As a last step, we need to characterize the low type’s optimal level of
consumption c⇤L. First, note that the public budget constraint is still given by:
c⇤L + c
⇤
H = y
⇤
L + y
⇤
H. Recall that " of the additional output produced by low types
is redistributed towards high types. Thus, the remaining amount of the additional
output will be consumed by low types:
c⇤L = c
SB
L + y
⇤
L   ySBL   " (2.44)
Equation 2.44 states that consumption for low types increases by the ad-
ditional output that they produce minus ". With " small, this means that low
type individuals essentially move up the isotax curve. Since we know that in the
standard second-best allocation ySBL is distorted downwards
v0
✓
ySBL
wL
◆
1
wL
< 1 (2.45)
it is immediately clear that a move up the isotax curve yields an increase in
material payoff for low type individuals.
Thus, the optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H) is a Pareto improvement over
(cSBL , y
SB
L , c
SB
H , y
SB
H ) as both high types and low types receive strictly higher ma-
terial payoffs and generate positive kindness.
Equations 2.28, 2.29, 2.43 and 2.44 fully characterize the optimal allocation
(c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H), as summarized by Proposition 1. This allocation is incentive
compatible, as explained by Lemma 1. Hence, a Pareto improving BNFE indeed
exists where all low type individuals play aL⇤ and all high type individuals play
aH.
Proposition 1: The optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H) subject to budget
and incentive constraints that can be reached in a BNFE of the game described
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above is characterized by
v0
✓
y⇤H
wH
◆
1
wH
= 1 (2.46)
c⇤H   v
✓
y⇤H
wH
◆
= c⇤L   v
✓
y⇤L
wH
◆
   
2
(2.47)
c⇤H = c
SB
H + " (2.48)
c⇤L = c
SB
L + y
⇤
L   ySBL   " (2.49)
where " > 0 is small, and constitutes a Pareto improvement over the standard
second-best allocation.
Note that " > 0 should be as small as possible to maximize welfare in the
optimal allocation. By optimality of the standard second-best allocation we know
that the welfare gain from marginally increasing y⇤L exactly equals the welfare
loss from compensating the high type in order to restore incentive compatibility.
This equality is captured by equation 2.18. This is equivalent to saying that the
welfare gain from marginally increasing c⇤H and creating slack in the high type’s
incentive constraint is equal to the welfare loss from increasing y⇤L to restore
budget feasibility. In the optimal allocation, with ySBL < y
⇤
L, quasi-linearity and
single-crossing imply that:
1   v0
✓
y⇤L
wL
◆
1
wL
 
✓
v0
✓
y⇤L
wL
◆
1
wL
  v0
✓
y⇤L
wH
◆
1
wH
◆
< 0 (2.50)
Thus, any increase in c⇤H and an associated increase in y
⇤
L to maintain binding
incentive and budget constraints would lead to a strict welfare loss. Thus, in the
optimal allocation " should be as small as possible.
Graphically, Figure 2.1 depicts the optimal allocation (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H), in the
BNFE in which all high types play aH and all low types play aL⇤ . The con-
sumption for high types is increased by ". The optimal allocation for low types
is bounded from above by the budget constraint (depicted by the dashed 45 
isotax curve) and the high type’s incentive constraint (depicted by the dashed
red line). Since material payoff for the low type is increasing as he moves up the
isotax curve and decreasing as he moves up the high type’s indifference curve,
the optimal allocation lies at the intersection of the two.
Robustness against low prevalence of intention-based preferences
As an extension, I show that the BNFE from Proposition 1 exists even if a
(sufficiently small) share of the population does not exhibit intention-based pref-
erences.
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Figure  . 
Let f  denote the proportion of individuals who exhibit intention-based pref-
erences. Then, a share (1  f ) of individuals is "selfish" in the sense that they
only care about their material payoffs, which can be expressed by setting   = 0
in their utility functions. I will maintain the assumption that the population
shares of high and low productivity types are equal, and also assume that the
share of selfish individuals is the same for each productivity type.
I further assume that individuals with intention-based preferences will take
into account the kindness of all other individuals, even those who are selfish.
The kindness of high type individuals as a group will be given by the sum of
individual kindness weighted by the population shares. Lastly, I will modify the
mechanism described in the previous section by implementing (c⇤L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H)
even when ⇢H < 12 . In this case, consumption for low types c
⇤
L will be lowered in
order to maintain a balanced budget.
It is immediately clear that in the BNFE described by Propisition 1, selfish
high type individuals would pretend to be a low type and play aL⇤ , since this
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yields the highest material payoff. This has two implications which may limit
the existence of a BNFE as described by Proposition 1.
First, selfish high type individuals pretending to be a low type will be per-
ceived as unkind by individuals with intention-based preferences. Thus, if too
many high type individuals are selfish, then high types as a group will be per-
ceived as unkind and low types with intention-based preferences will want to act
unkindly, thus making it impossible to sustain a welfare improving BNFE. Here,
kindness of high types as a group is given by:
f  ˜H(aH, aL
⇤
) + (1   f )˜H(aL⇤ , aL⇤) (2.51)
= f 
1
2
+ (1   f )( 12) (2.52)
= f    12 (2.53)
Thus, for high types’ kindness to be perceived as positive on the aggregate we
need f  > 12 .
Second, selfish high types who play aL⇤ put pressure on the resource con-
straint. If only a share f  of high types produces more output than they consume,
then less resources are available to be redistributed to low type individuals in
equilibrium. This, too, makes it difficult to sustain a Pareto improving BNFE
if sufficiently many high types are selfish. The new resource constraint is then
given by:
y⇤L   c⇤L + f (y⇤H   c⇤H) + (1   f )(y⇤L   c⇤L) = 0 (2.54)
Hence of every unit of consumption that the planner intents to extract from
high types, he can only redistribute a share f 2 f  to low types. The rest is lost
because of the behavioral response of those high type individuals that have selfish
preferences.
Graphically, as f  decreases, (c⇤L, y
⇤
L) moves upwards along the indifference
curve of high types in order to maintain budget feasibility, which yields a decrease
in material payoff for low types. Let f denote the smallest value for f  such that
low types still prefer (c⇤L, y
⇤
L) over (c
SB
L , y
SB
L ). If f  < f then (c
⇤
L, y
⇤
L, c
⇤
H, y
⇤
H) is no
longer sustained by the BNFE described in Proposition 1 because low types are
strictly worse off than in the standard second-best allocation.
Hence, in order to sustain a Pareto improving BNFE as described by Propo-
sition 1, we need that
f  > max{
1
2
, f} (2.55)
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 .  Conclusion
The paper demonstrates that in the presence of intention-based preferences, we
can implement an allocation as the unique BNFE that Pareto dominates the
Stiglitz (1982) allocation. Allowing the "poor" to exert a higher labor effort gen-
erates positive kindness which is reciprocated by the "rich" and creates slack
in their incentive constraints. The interpretation is that the rich do not mind
helping the poor if they "do their part" by working harder. Importantly, I show
that there exists a nonwelfarist principle which facilitates a Pareto superior al-
location. Because intention-based preferences constitute a notion of procedural
justice, the implementation of this allocation requires altering individuals’ choice
sets. It is thus an allocation that cannot be characterized by the maximization
of any weighted social welfare function.
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.Chapter  
Demand for think tanks in the
presence of (non-)partisan experts
 .  Introduction
In the United States, 1,839 "think tanks" operated in 2014. McGann (2016)
posits that these think tanks take on "critical roles in the policymaking process
by offering original research and analysis, [and] providing policy advice" which
enable policy makers to make informed decisions. Further, many think tanks
act as advocacy groups and "possess extremely strong ideologies or focus on
persuading policymakers and the public on short-term, specific policy debates."
Examples of such advocacy-oriented think tanks include the Heritage Foundation
and the Center for American Progress, respectively on the right and left of the
political spectrum. In the United States, 36% of think tanks self-identify as
partisan – representing either conservative, libertarian, or progressive positions
– and "view their role in the policymaking process as winning the war of ideas
rather than disinterestedly searching for the best policies." (McGann, 2016).
Hence, as an industry, these think tanks produce partisan research to inform
and influence policy makers.
One way in which think tanks influence policy makers is by providing infor-
mation. As McGann observes, "U.S. politicians and bureaucrats have increas-
ingly turned to think tanks to provide research and systematic analysis that are
reliable, policy relevant, and, above all, useful." In the context of public finance,
relevant research concerns in particular the estimation of economic parameters
that are crucial for the optimal design of fiscal policy. For example, policy makers
require information about the size of the deadweight loss caused by taxation, or
the extent to which redistribution shrinks the size of the "economic pie." Promi-
nent examples of such parameters are the elasticity of taxable income and the
efficiency of government. Policy makers rely on the correct estimation of these
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parameters for the optimal choice of progressivity of the tax system and size of
the government. McGann points out that the relationship between think tanks
and policy makers "mimics that of a market – a market of knowledge. The de-
mand for think tanks’ policy research is driven by the legislative demand for
relevant information."
This existing "market of knowledge" as described by McGann poses a puzzle,
however, when considering that a large academic literature produces research on
the same topics (see Saez, Slemrod, and Giertz (2012) for a recent overview). The
question arises, how can demand for think tanks co-exist with the vast amount
of information that is made publicly available by academic researchers? This
paper aims to answer this question and ventures that demand for think tanks
can only exist if academic research is itself partisan.
The paper proposes a model of Bayesian voters who differ in their pre-tax
incomes and are uncertain about the deadweight loss caused by taxation. For
example, they might be uncertain about the elasticity of taxable income or the
government’s administrative cost. Individuals form beliefs over the inefficiency
of taxation and vote over a linear income tax rate. The government then uses tax
revenue to provide a public good. Voters benefit from more precise information
about the "state of the world," that is, the true efficiency of the tax system. If
individuals believe that the deadweight loss caused by taxation is small, they will
(ceteris paribus) prefer a higher tax rate. An academic expert observes the true
state of the world and communicates his information via a cheap talk message to
the electorate. Dependent on how credible the expert’s message is, individuals
may choose to pay for a think tank. Think tanks are assumed to have access
to the same information as an academic expert, but they have a partisan bias.
That is, think tanks are modeled as strategic communicators that represent
the interests of a certain part of the electorate, rather than trying to truthfully
inform all individuals about the state of the world. I show that in the presence of
a non-partisan academic expert, there exists no demand for think tanks. Indeed,
demand for think tanks exists if and only if there is a strictly positive probability
that the academic expert is partisan himself.
The paper builds on previous work on electoral competition over linear tax
rates, such as Roberts (1977), and adds to it by considering voters who are un-
certain about the efficiency of the tax system. Information about this efficiency
is conveyed in a game of cheap talk by Crawford and Sobel (1982). Previous
1. In the United States, think tanks like the Cato Institute, the Heritage Foundation,
and the American Enterprise Institute, for example, respectively receive 83%, 59%, and 58%
of their income from individual contributions (McGann, 2016).
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research has studied the effect of cheap talk lobbying on electoral competition,
for example by Austen-Smith and Wright (1992) who study strategic commu-
nication between lobbyists and elected legislators. However, to the best of my
knowledge, no previous work has studied lobbying as strategic communication
with the electorate. This paper is most closely related to Roemer (1994) who an-
alyzes the origin of party ideology when voters are uncertain about the efficiency
of redistribution. Roemer, however, considers voters who are not Bayesian and
would be influenced even by non-credible information. The question why pol-
icy makers rely on information provided by partisan think tanks, as opposed to
non-partisan academics, also relates to work by Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole
(1999), who study why decision makers prefer to rely on advocates of special
interests rather than an unbiased representative. In their setting, a principal
(for example a judge) hires agents (lawyers) to investigate two competing causes
by collecting evidence that is ex-post verifiable. Because the agents’ rewards
are conditional on the principal’s decision and not on the information collected,
there exists an incentive problem, as it is costly to incentivize a non-partisan
agent to investigate two causes if finding contradictory evidence (that is, evi-
dence in support of both causes) results in zero rewards. In their setting it is
thus desirable for the principal to hire two partisan agents who are rewarded
only if the principal’s decision favors their cause. Lastly, political scientists have
also studied demand for think tanks. For example, empirical work by Bertelli
and Wenger (2009) suggests that legislative debate as modeled by Austen-Smith
drives demand for strategic information and creates a market opportunity for
political entrepreneurs to create think tanks.
In addition to contributing to the literature on the applied theory of pub-
lic finance, this paper also hopes to pose an interesting question for economic
researchers to reflect on.
 .  The model
There is an economy with n citizens who differ in their skill types !1, ...,!n with
!i < !j , i < j. An individual of type !i has preferences given by
u(c,G, y,!i) = c + G   ↵1 + ↵
✓
y
!i
◆ 1+↵
↵
(3.1)
where c is consumption of a private good, G is consumption of a public good,
and y is pre-tax income. Individuals choose their optimal pre-tax income
y(⌧ ,!i) = argmax
y
u(c,G, y,!i) subject to c = (1   ⌧)y (3.2)
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where ⌧ 2 [0, ⌧ ] is a linear tax rate.
 . .  Taxes and public good provision
The government collects tax revenue and provides a public good G(⌧ , ✓), which
depends on the tax rate ⌧ as well as on the efficiency cost of taxation ✓ 2 {✓L, ✓H},
✓L < ✓H. Individuals cannot observe the true value of ✓. Instead, they only know
its prior distribution, namely that ✓ = ✓H with probability pH, and ✓ = ✓L with
probability (1  pH).
In the following subsections I outline two alternative ways in which uncer-
tainty over inefficiency in the public sector may occur and thus how the parame-
ter ✓ may be interpreted. First, I will consider uncertainty over the government’s
productivity of providing the public good G. Second, I will consider uncertainty
over the extent of incentive problems of taxation, that is, uncertainty over the
elasticity of taxable income. These two cases should be understood as alternative
specifications for this model. Either one could serve as an interpretation of the
underlying uncertainty represented by the "state of the world" ✓.
 . . .  Alternative I: Uncertainty over the government’s productivity
First, suppose that individuals are uncertain over the government’s productivity
of public good provision. As the government collects tax revenue and produces
a public good G, it incurs administrative costs that are a deadweight loss to
society. Specifically, of all the dollars of tax revenue collected, only a share ✓ will
be invested in public good provision. The government’s production function is
then given by:
G(⌧ , ✓) =
✓
n
nX
i=1
⌧y(⌧ ,!i) (3.3)
where ✓ 2 {✓L, ✓H} is the government’s productivity with respect to public good
provision. Thus, government productivity is high with probability pH and low
with probability 1  pH. Pre-tax incomes do not depend on ✓ and are given by
y(⌧ ,!i) = (1   ⌧)↵!i, (3.4)
hence the elasticity of taxable income is known and equal to
"i =
(1   ⌧)
y(⌧ ,!i)
@y(⌧ ,!i)
@(1   ⌧) = ↵. (3.5)
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 . . .  Alternative II: Uncertainty over the elasticity of taxable income
Alternatively, suppose that individuals are uncertain over the aggregate elastic-
ity of taxable income. Any increase in the tax rate reduces every individual’s
incentive to work and thus lowers the total output in the economy. In addition,
the richest individuals may find it profitable to engage in tax avoidance, which
has a negative effect on the total amount of tax revenue collected. But the size of
this effect may be difficult to estimate for all other individuals who do not have
access to instruments of tax avoidance. Thus, individuals are uncertain about
the size of the deadweight loss that is caused by taxation and the financing of
the public good G. Specifically, let a small number (n  k) of the richest indi-
viduals have an elasticity of taxable income ✓ that is unknown to the rest of the
population. Preferences then differ for these individuals as follows:
u(c,G, y,!i)
8><>:c + G  
↵
1+↵
⇣
y
!i
⌘ 1+↵
↵ , for i = 1, ..., n   k   1
c + G   ✓1+✓
⇣
y
!i
⌘ 1+✓
✓ , for i = n   k, ..., n
(3.6)
Pre-tax incomes are then given by
y(⌧ ,!i) =
(
(1   ⌧)↵!i , for i = 1, ..., n   k   1
(1   ⌧)✓!i , for i = n   k, ..., n
(3.7)
where it is assumed that !n k!n k 1 > (1  ⌧)↵ ✓H , so that pre-tax incomes are
strictly increasing in the skill type. Individual elasticities of taxable income are
equal to
"i =
(1   ⌧)
y(⌧ ,!i)
@y(⌧ ,!i)
@(1   ⌧) =
(
↵ , for i = 1, ..., n   k   1
✓ , for i = n   k, ..., n (3.8)
and the aggregate elasticity of taxable income is then given by
" =
(1   ⌧)Pn
i=1 y(⌧ ,!i)
@
Pn
i=1 y(⌧ ,!i)
@(1   ⌧) (3.9)
=
(1   ⌧)Pn
i=1 y(⌧ ,!i)
nX
i=1
@y(⌧ ,!i)
@(1   ⌧) (3.10)
=
1Pn
i=1 y(⌧ ,!i)
nX
i=1
"iy(⌧ ,!i) (3.11)
=
1Pn
i=1 y(⌧ ,!i)
 
↵
n k 1X
i=1
y(⌧ ,!i) + ✓
nX
i=n k
y(⌧ ,!i)
!
(3.12)
(3.13)
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Clearly, individuals are uncertain over the aggregate elasticity of taxable income,
because it depends on the true value of ✓. Finally, the government’s production
function then equals
G(⌧ , ✓) =
1
n
nX
i=1
⌧y(⌧ ,!i) (3.14)
which depends on ✓ because y(⌧ ,!i) depends on ✓ for i = (n  k), ..., n. In this
specification there is no administrative cost of the government, hence every dollar
of tax revenue collected will be invested in public good provision.
 . .  Expert messages and individual beliefs
The true value of ✓ is observed only by an expert. Consider for example an
academic institution that conducts research on the elasticity of taxable income
or the government’s productivity. The academic expert can costlessly observe ✓
and communicate the value via a cheap talk message  E 2 { L, H} indicating
that the deadweight loss caused by taxation is low or high, respectively. This
message is observed by all individuals. The expert’s preferences will be described
in detail below. It will be clear that the expert’s preferences are relevant for his
ability to credibly transmit information about ✓. Given the expert’s message  E,
all individuals form posterior beliefs over the value of ✓. This posterior belief is
defined as follows:
Definition 1: Let b be the individual belief over the probability that the
government’s efficiency is high, that is,
b = Pr[✓ = ✓H |  E] (3.15)
The posterior belief b will be the same for all individuals, because all indi-
viduals have the same prior belief and observe the same message  E sent by the
expert. An individual’s (expected) indirect utility is then denoted
E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!i) | b] = (1   ⌧)y(⌧ ,!i) + E✓[G(⌧ , ✓) | b]   ↵1 + ↵
✓
y(⌧ ,!i)
!i
◆ 1+↵
↵
(3.16)
where only the amount of public good provision is uncertain and its expectation
is dependent on the posterior b.
2. In this alternative specification one can argue that (n  k) individuals would know the
true value of ✓ with certainty, because it appears in their utility function. This is not a cause
for concern, however, if (n  k) is only a small number of people (say, the top 1% of the income
distribution). This group does not include the median voter and, as will become clear in the
analysis of the model below, is unable to credibly transmit information about the true value
of ✓ to anybody else.
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 . .  Voting over taxes
All individuals vote over the linear tax rate ⌧ . The tax rate that is a Condorcet
winner in this election will be implemented. There are many voting processes
that implement a Condorcet winner, most famously the model by Black (1948)
in which individuals engage in pairwise majority voting, or the Downs (1957)
model of political competition in a two-party system. Rather than choosing a
specific voting process in this paper, I will outline that there exists a Condorcet
winner which can be implemented by any of these well known models of political
competition.
Lemma 1: The median voter’s preferred tax rate
⌧(b,!M) = argmax
⌧2[0,⌧ ]
E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!M) | b] (3.17)
where M is the median of 1, ..., n, is a Condorcet winner among all tax rates
[0, ⌧ ].
Proof: Note first that using the Envelope theorem we have
@
@⌧E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!i) | b] =  y(⌧ ,!i) +
@
@⌧
E✓[G(⌧ , ✓) | b] (3.18)
and @2@⌧@!iE✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!i) | b] =  
@
@!i
y(⌧ ,!i) < 0 (3.19)
This implies that the following single-crossing property holds, which is intro-
duced in Gans and Smart (1996): If an individual of type !i prefers a low tax
rate ⌧ over ⌧ 0 > ⌧ , then all individuals who are richer than individual i will also
prefer ⌧ over ⌧ 0. Formally:
For ⌧ 0 > ⌧ , E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!i) | b] > E✓[V(⌧ 0, ✓,!i) | b]
) E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!j) | b] > E✓[V(⌧ 0, ✓,!j) | b] 8j > i(3.20)
Conversely, if individual i prefers ⌧ over a lower tax rate ⌧ 00 < ⌧ , then all indi-
viduals who are poorer than individual i will also prefer ⌧ over ⌧ 00:
For ⌧ 00 < ⌧ , E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!i) | b] > E✓[V(⌧ 00, ✓,!i) | b]
) E✓[V(⌧ , ✓,!j) | b] > E✓[V(⌧ 00, ✓,!j) | b] 8j < i(3.21)
Consequently this property implies that half the population (all individuals with
an income smaller than the median voter’s) prefers ⌧(b,!M) over any lower tax
rate. Similarly, the other half of the population (all individuals with an income
greater than the median voter’s) prefers ⌧(b,!M) over any higher tax rate. Thus,
⌧(b,!M) is a Condorcet winner among all tax rates.
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If the deadweight loss caused by taxation is expected to be lower – that is,
as b increases – the median voter will ceteris paribus prefer a higher tax rate:
@⌧(b,!M)
@b   0. Thus, information about the true value of ✓ has political relevance
because it influences the tax rate that is implemented in the election.
 . .  Timing and equilibrium
The timing of the model is as follows. First, nature determines the value of
✓ 2 {✓L, ✓H}, which is only observed by the expert. Second, the expert sends a
message  E 2 { L, H}, which is observed by everybody, to communicate the
value of ✓. Given the expert’s message, individuals update their belief b over
✓. Third, the tax rate that is a Condorcet winner given individuals’ belief b is
implemented. Fourth, individuals choose their pre-tax incomes y(⌧ ,!) and the
government collects tax revenue to provide the public good G(⌧ , ✓).
The equilibrium concept is that of Weak Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, in
which the following conditions hold.
• Each individual chooses their pre-tax income y(⌧ ,!i) optimally given their
belief b over the efficiency of taxation.
• The tax rate ⌧ is the Condorcet winner among all tax rates that are individ-
ually optimal given belief b.
• Individuals update their belief b = Pr[✓ = ✓H |  E] according to Bayes’ rule
after observing the expert’s message  E.
• The expert sends the message  E that maximizes his payoff in anticipation of
individual belief formation, the Condorcet winning tax rate, and individual
incomes.
 .  Non-partisan expert
As a benchmark case, I will first consider an expert who is non-partisan. Consider
an academic expert who has no preferences over taxes and who’s only objective
is to truthfully announce the value of ✓. This means that all individuals will
be perfectly informed about the efficiency of taxation by observing the expert’s
message. Since everyone will know the value of ✓ with certainty, their belief will
be given by b = 0 if  E =  L, or b = 1 if  E =  H. By the median voter result
described above, the equilibrium tax rate will be given by:
⌧(b,!M) with b =
(
0 if ✓ = ✓L
1 if ✓ = ✓H
(3.22)
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Demand for a think tank
Suppose that individuals are given the option to pool their resources and build a
think tank that acts as an additional expert. That is, a think tank would be able
to observe the true value of ✓ and send a message  TT 2 { L, H} to inform the
electorate about the government’s efficiency. It is clear that there is no demand
for a think tank in the presence of a non-partisan expert, because everyone is
already perfectly informed in equilibrium. This means that if an academic expert
who is non-partisan truthfully reveals the efficiency of the government, then no
individual should be willing to spend resources on a think tank.
 .  Partisan expert
For the remainder of this paper I will consider the case in which the expert is par-
tisan. That is, the expert’s objective is to maximize the utility of some individual
of type !E. In the following I will refer to !E as the expert’s "bias," because
the expert’s preferences deviate from the preferences of the median voter. If the
expert is partisan, or "biased," his message becomes strategic communication in
a cheap talk game with all individuals. The expert anticipates how his message
affects individual beliefs and the resulting equilibrium tax rate, and sends the
message that maximizes the equilibrium utility of individuals of type !E.
In this section I will characterize the strategic communication game and
the equilibrium tax rates. I first assume that the expert’s preferences are pub-
licly known. In this case, individuals understand the expert’s incentives and
can properly interpret his message to update their beliefs. Afterwards, I repeat
the analysis for the case in which individuals are uncertain about the expert’s
preferences.
 . .  Known bias
Suppose the expert’s preferences are known to all individuals. Building on the
analysis from Crawford and Sobel (1982), it becomes clear that the communi-
cation game between the expert and all individuals has two possible equilibria:
one in which the true value of ✓ is fully revealed by the expert, and one in which
the expert "babbles" and discloses no information about ✓. Which equilibrium
occurs depends on the expert’s bias. The expert understands that revealing his
information about the government’s efficiency will influence everybody’s prefer-
ences over taxes and thus affect the equilibrium tax rate. The expert will be
willing to reveal the government’s efficiency if and only if it is beneficial for
him to influence the equilibrium tax rate in this direction. In other words, the
fully informative equilibrium occurs if and only if the expert’s and the median
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voter’s preferences are sufficiently aligned. To show this, I introduce the following
definition:
Definition 2: Let ! and !, with !1 < ! < ! < !n, be given by:
V(⌧(0,!M), ✓L,!) = V(⌧(1,!M), ✓L,!) (3.23)
V(⌧(1,!M), ✓H,!) = V(⌧(0,!M), ✓H,!) (3.24)
Recall that ⌧(0,!M) and ⌧(1,!M) are the only two tax rates that can result
in equilibrium if all individuals are perfectly informed, as stated by equation
(3.22). Equation (3.23) then defines a skill type ! such that any individual with
a type ! < ! will always want the median voter to implement ⌧(1,!M), the
higher of the two possible tax rates. Conversely, equation (3.24) defines a skill
type ! such that any individual with a type ! > ! will always want the median
voter to implement ⌧(0,!M), the lower of the possible tax rates.
This implies that any expert with a bias !E < ! has no incentive to reveal
that the efficiency of taxation is low. Such an expert always prefers high taxes,
no matter what the true state of the world is. Hence, if individuals were to
believe the expert’s message, then he should always send the pro-redistribution
message  H. But since individuals understand his conflict of interest they will
never believe any message that the expert sends. On the other hand, any expert
with bias !E > ! will never find it profitable to reveal that the government’s
efficiency is high, because he always prefers low taxes regardless of the state of
the world. Thus, whenever the expert’s bias is !E 62 [!,!], the communication
game between the expert and all individuals results in a "babbling" equilibrium
which is completely uninformative.
The only case in which the expert has an incentive to truthfully reveal the
value of ✓ is when !E 2 [!,!]. From Definition 2 it is clear that in this case it
holds that:
V(⌧(0,!M), ✓L,!E) > V(⌧(1,!M), ✓L,!E) (3.25)
and
V(⌧(1,!M), ✓H,!E) > V(⌧(0,!M), ✓H,!E) (3.26)
That is, it is always in the expert’s interest to send a truthful message about the
government’s efficiency, because the expert’s objective is maximized whenever
the median voter is fully informed. Because the expert’s bias is known, individ-
uals understand the expert’s incentives to lie or to speak the truth. Thus, they
believe the expert’s message if and only if !E 2 [!,!], that is, whenever the ex-
pert’s and median voter’s preferences are sufficiently aligned. In this case, they
will update their belief to b = 0 if  E =  L, or b = 1 if  E =  H.
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Demand for a think tank
Now, consider again the opportunity for individuals to create a think tank that
acts just like an additional expert. A think tank can observe the true value of ✓
and sends a message  TT 2 { L, H} to inform the electorate about the govern-
ment’s efficiency. Analogously to the expert, a think tank will have a known bias
!TT, that is, it represents the interests of some individual of type !TT which is
known to everybody. In the following passage, I characterize individuals’ demand
for such a think tank. I use the term "demand" to describe an individual’s will-
ingness to pay for a think tank at time zero, that is, before the expert sends his
message. In other words, demand for a think tank equals the difference between
an individual’s expected equilibrium utility in absence of a think tank and in
the presence of a think tank.
It is clear that if !E 2 [!,!], then there is no demand for a think tank. In
this case, the expert’s "bias" is sufficiently small so that he always truthfully
reveals the government’s efficiency. Thus, even though the expert is partisan, he
acts exactly like a non-partisan expert. Just like in our benchmark case with a
non-partisan expert, everyone is fully informed and has no demand for a think
tank.
However, if !E 62 [!,!], then demand for a think tank exists. In this case the
expert is unable to communicate any information about ✓ whatsoever. If a think
tank can effectively convey information about the government’s efficiency, there
will be a positive number of individuals who are willing to pay for the think
tank. Note that for a think tank to credibly communicate any information it
must hold that !TT 2 [!,!]. That is, there only exists demand for a think tank
with a bias that is small enough for it to fully inform voters about the value of
✓. This would be a think tank that acts like a non-partisan expert and always
sends a truthful message about the government’s efficiency.
Let DKB denote an individual’s demand for a think tank with known bias
!TT 2 [!,!], that is, a think tank that truthfully reveals the government’s ef-
ficiency. As mentioned above, individual demand equals the difference between
expected equilibrium utility in the presence of a think tank (when everyone is
fully informed) and in absence of a think tank (when everyone has no information
3. I will only characterize demand for a think tank and not model the supply side. Cre-
ating a think tank clearly involves costs that could outweigh aggregate willingness to pay.
Further, the resources that individuals can mobilize might be smaller than their aggregate
willingness to pay due to free-riders and other collective action problems. Providing a model
for the creation of think tanks goes beyond the scope of this paper and I will solely characterize
the demand side of the market for think tanks.
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about ✓ other than their prior). Then individual demand is given by
DKB(!i) = pH
 
V(⌧(1,!M), ✓H,!i)   V(⌧(pH,!M), ✓H,!i)
 
+ pL
 
V(⌧(0,!M), ✓L,!i)   V(⌧(pH,!M), ✓L,!i)
 
(3.27)
Note that there is at least one individual who has positive demand for a
think tank, namely the median voter: DKB(!M) > 0. Under full information she
can achieve her highest possible expected utility and is thus trivially better off
in the presence of a think tank. Some individuals may not have positive demand
for a think tank, however. To see this, note that the first term of equation
(3.27) is negative for individuals of type !i > !. Similarly, the second term of
equation (3.27) is negative for individuals of type !i < !. There may thus be
individuals who are worse off in the presence of a think tank and would prefer
that everyone received no further information than their prior. In general, an
individual’s demand for a think tank is greater if their preferences are more
closely aligned with the median voter’s preferences.
Let ⌦DKB = [!i | DKB(!i) > 0] denote the set of all individuals who receive
a net benefit from a think tank. We know that ⌦DKB is non-empty as it contains
at least !M. Proposition 1 then follows directly.
Proposition 1: If the expert’s bias is known, demand for a think tank with
bias !TT 2 [!,!] exists if and only if !E 62 [!,!] and is given by:
DKB =
X
!i2⌦DKB
DKB(!i) (3.28)
Hence we should only expect to observe demand for a think tank if experts are
too biased to convey any meaningful information.
 . .  Unknown bias
Next, suppose that individuals are uncertain about the expert’s preferences.
Specifically, I will assume in this section that the expert’s bias is !E < ! with
probability q, and !E 2 [!,!M] with probability 1  q. Thus, individuals know
for certain that the expert has a pro-redistribution bias because !E < !M. How-
ever, individuals do not know whether the expert’s bias is larger or smaller than
! and thus they do not know a priori whether they can believe the expert’s
message.
With probability q the expert has an "extreme" bias !E < ! and will always
send the pro-redistribution message  H, regardless of the true value of ✓. With
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probability (1  q) the expert has a "moderate" bias !E 2 [!,!M] and will al-
ways send a true message about the government’s efficiency. This means that if
individuals observe the message  L, they will understand that the expert must
have a "moderate" bias and that they can believe his message. This is because
they understand that a pro-redistribution expert who announces that the gov-
ernment’s efficiency is low must have a moderate bias and thus must be saying
the truth. The logic here is similar to the analysis of Cukierman and Tommasi
(1998) that "it takes a Nixon to go to China," that is, unlikely political actions
can serve to credibly transmit information. Hence, if individuals observe  L, they
correctly believe that the government’s efficiency is low and update their belief
to b( L) = 0.
On the other hand, if the expert sends the anti-redistribution message  H,
individuals cannot fully trust the message. They have to account for the possi-
bility that the government’s efficiency is actually low, but that the expert has
an "extreme" bias and is lying. Thus, individuals use Bayes’ rule to update their
belief to b( H) = p
H
pH+(1 pH)q .
The equilibrium tax rate will then be given by:
⌧(b,!M) with b =
8<:0 , if  E =  LpH
pH+(1 pH)q , if  E =  
H
(3.29)
Thus, an individual of type !i has the following expected equilibrium utility:
(1   pH)

q V
✓
⌧
✓
pH
pH + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓L,!i
◆
+(1   q)V  ⌧(0,!M), ✓L,!i    (3.30)
+ pH V
✓
⌧
✓
pH
pH + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓H,!i
◆
I will go through each part of equation (30) separately for the sake of clarity.
With probability (1  pH) the government’s efficiency is low. If the expert is
"extreme," which happens with probability q, he sends a false pro-redistribution
message  H. Individuals use Bayes’ rule to update their beliefs, but they remain
uncertain about the true value of ✓. Hence, the expert successfully manipulates
individual beliefs in this case and distorts the equilibrium tax rate upwards.
If the expert is "moderate," he sends a truthful message  L and all individuals
correctly believe him. As discussed above, this is the only case in which an expert
can credibly transmit information and all individuals are perfectly informed.
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With probability pH the government’s efficiency is high. In this case the ex-
pert will always send the true message  L. But because individuals cannot verify
whether the expert’s message is truthful, they update their belief according to
Bayes’ rule. In this case the equilibrium tax rate is distorted downwards even
though the expert is truthful, because individuals cannot be sure that a pro-
redistribution message sent by a pro-redistribution expert is true. Thus, while
individuals with "extreme" pro-redistribution biases benefit from distorted be-
liefs when the government’s efficiency is low, they are hurt by the same distortion
when the government’s efficiency is high and they fail to credibly transmit that
information.
Demand for a think tank
Now, suppose that individuals can pool their resources to create a think tank
which has a bias !TT 2 [!M,!] with probability r, and !TT > ! with proba-
bility 1  r. Such a think tank would represent the interest of individuals with
an anti-redistribution bias who are not represented by the expert. Just as the
expert’s bias is unknown, I assume here that a think tank would similarly have
an unknown bias that is "extreme" with some probability r.
In the presence of both an expert and a think tank, individuals form their
beliefs on the basis of two messages:
b( E, TT) = Pr[✓ = ✓H |  E, TT] (3.31)
Since the expert and the think tank have opposing biases, there is a higher
chance that individuals will be perfectly informed in equilibrium. Without a
think tank, individuals would only know the government’s efficiency with cer-
tainty if the pro-redistribution expert sends an anti-redistribution message. Now,
the opposite may occur as well, when the anti-redistribution think tank sends a
pro-redistribution message. By the same logic as above, individuals understand
that only a "moderate" think tank would send a pro-redistribution message and
thus correctly update their belief to b = 1. Thus, the only case in which the me-
dian voter is uncertain about ✓ is when the expert sends  E =  H and the think
tank sends  TT =  L. In this case, individuals know that one of the senders must
be lying, but they do not know which one. Consequently they will update their
belief b( E, TT) according to Bayes’ rule:
b( L, ·) = 0 (3.32)
b(·, H) = 1 (3.33)
b( H, L) = p
Hr
pHr+(1 pH)q (3.34)
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After a think tank has been created, expected equilibrium utility for an
individual of type !i is then given by:
(1   pH)

q V
✓
⌧
✓
pHr
pHr + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓L,!i
◆
+(1   q)V  ⌧(0,!M), ✓L,!i    (3.35)
+ pH

r V
✓
⌧
✓
pHr
pHr + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓H,!i
◆
+(1   r)V  ⌧(1,!M), ✓H,!i   
In the presence of a think tank, the chance that individuals know the true
value of ✓ with certainty increases to (1  pH)(1  q)+ pH(1  r), namely when-
ever either the pro-redistribution expert sends an anti-redistribution message
or the anti-redistribution think tank sends a pro-redistribution message. In all
other cases, individuals remain uncertain about the true value of ✓, but the think
tank’s message lowers their belief b that the government’s efficiency is high. Thus,
the think tank is effective in persuading the median voter towards a lower tax
rate in equilibrium.
Demand for a think tank with unknown bias !TT for an individual of type
!i is then given by the difference between equations (35) and (30):
DUB(!i) = (1   pH)q

V
✓
⌧
✓
pHr
pHr + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓L,!i
◆
  V
✓
⌧
✓
pH
pH + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓L,!i
◆ 
+ pHr

V
✓
⌧
✓
pHr
pHr + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓H,!i
◆
(3.36)
  V
✓
⌧
✓
pH
pH + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓H,!i
◆ 
+ pH(1   r)

V
 
⌧(1,!M), ✓H,!i
 
 V
✓
⌧
✓
pH
pH + (1   pH)q,!M
◆
, ✓H,!i
◆ 
In the following I will go through each possible state of the world to shed
further light on individual demand for a think tank in this case.
With probability (1  pH)q the government’s efficiency is low but the expert
lies and sends a pro-redistribution message  H. The think tank sends an opposing
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message  L, thus individuals remain uncertain about the true value of ✓. In this
case, the think tank’s message has a downwards effect on the equilibrium tax
rate. The think tank’s presence reduces distortions by making individuals’ beliefs
about the government’s efficiency more accurate. All individuals benefit from the
think tank’s presence except for those who have "extreme" pro-redistribution
biases !i < !.
With probability (1  pH)(1  q) the government’s efficiency is low and the
expert sends a true message  L. In this case all individuals know with certainty
that ✓ = ✓L. The presence of a think tank has no effect on the equilibrium tax
rate in this case and therefore this case does not appear in the individual demand
equation above.
With probability pHr the government’s efficiency is high but the think tank
lies and sends an anti-redistribution message  L. The expert sends an opposing
message  H, thus individuals remain uncertain about the true value of ✓. In
this case, the think tank’s message has a downwards effect on the equilibrium
tax rate. However, beliefs become less accurate and are thus distorted by the
presence of the think tank. Here, the only individuals who benefit from the think
tank’s presence are those with "extreme" anti-redistribution biases !i < !, while
everyone else is worse off.
With probability pH(1  r) the government’s efficiency is high and the think
tank sends a true message  H. In this case all individuals know with certainty
that ✓ = ✓H because only a moderate think tank would send a pro-redistribution
message. Note that in this case individuals could not have been certain about
the government’s high efficiency without the presence of a think tank. Thus,
the think tank benefits all individuals except for those with "extreme" pro-
redistribution biases !i < !.
Let us define ⌦DUB = [!i | DUB(!i) > 0] as the set of all individuals who
receive a net benefit from a think tank. We know that ⌦DUB is non-empty as it
contains at least !M. Proposition 2 then follows directly.
Proposition 2: If the expert’s bias is unknown, demand for a think tank
with r < 1 exists if and only if q > 0 and is given by: DUB =
P
!i2⌦DUB D
UB(!i)
Thus, if an expert’s bias is unknown, demand for a think tank exists if and
only if there is a chance q > 0 that the expert’s bias is so extreme that he cannot
convey any meaningful information.
 .  Conclusion |   
 .  Conclusion
The analysis in this paper suggests that the existence of a market for think
tanks that we observe empirically should raise doubts about the neutrality of
academic research. If the electorate fully trusted the information published by
academia, we should not expect to observe any demand for think tanks that
conduct partisan research.
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